Recent research has also overturned another classic dogma in cognitive psychology: the idea that subliminal priming effects are automatic, rigid and independent of the subject's strategies or attention. The classic theory (Posner & Snyder, 1975) coincides a whole series of properties: the rapid, parallel, uncontrollable, non-intentional and non-conscious character of so-called "automatic" cognitive operations is contrasted with the slow, serial, controlled, intentional and conscious character of so-called "strategic" operations. There is little doubt that a distinction of this kind should be maintained, but the idea of a perfect dichotomy, with no overlap between automatic and controlled processes, has been undermined by the observation that attention and conscious strategies can modulate cognitive operations right down to the lowest level of perception. It therefore seems logical to postulate that subliminal priming may also be under the influence of conscious strategies.
The accuracy of this hypothesis was demonstrated in several stages. Firstly, it has been shown that subliminal priming depends on temporal attention: a subliminal stimulus that occurs at an unexpected time ceases to give rise to significant priming effects in response times (Naccache, Blandin & Dehaene, 2002). The same applies to spatial attention: the effect of a stimulus masked by meta-contrast varies according to whether or not its spatial position receives attentional amplification (Kentridge, Nijboer & Heywood, 2008).