Abstract
The number of passages in whichauctoritas is attributed to jurists is around thirty in Latin sources, from Cicero onwards : it is therefore an association familiar to the Romans. But what was its meaning ? To refer to one of the many modern theories on the notion of authority, such as that of Alexandre Kojève, would only distort the ancient meaning. The etymology ofauctoritas (from augere, meaning " to bring into being ") led É. Benveniste to define it as " that gift reserved for few men of bringing something into being and - to the letter - of producing into existence ". But etymology risks offering too many suggestions and too few limits. We must also avoid isolating the occurrences ofauctoritas concerning jurisconsults from the rest of the occurrences, also very frequent, where this quality is similarly attributed to other " intellectuals " (philosophers, historians, orators, poets, grammarians). It thus appears that - in most of the passages concerned - theauctoritas of jurists is only a special case within a rhetorical theory ofauctoritas (a theory of Greco-Hellenistic origin later transposed into Latin), which gives it a fairly precise meaning. This theory enables us to grasp the Ancients' point of view, and also helps us to draw up an articulated phenomenology of jurists'auctoritas. To narrow the focus of our investigation, we need to refer to the rhetorical theory developed by Cicero, in the context of proof by witnesses(Top., 73). He classifies the elements that make upauctoritas by distinguishing between intrinsic and permanent elements(natura) and extrinsic and transitory elements(tempus), before taking into account a second distinction, based on virtus (or lack of virtus). The case of experts, endowed with technical knowledge(ars, scientia) or know-how(usus), depends on an extrinsic element and is not based on virtus. But within the scope of their knowledge, they enjoy a reputation of reliability with the public. This is also true of jurists, in their own field. Theauctoritas of jurists is therefore, in this perspective, their ability to persuade ; it is a dynamic value that underlines the relative weight of jurists' opinions compared to the discussions of orators in a trial.
Based on these premises, the lecture proposed an outline of this rhetorical theory, distinguishing the external (extra-systemic) side of jurists'auctoritas (i.e. in the trial, where it designates the ability of their responses to persuade the judge) from the intra-systemic side (in the dialogue between jurists themselves) and also separating the individual dimension ofauctoritas (of the particular jurist) from its collective dimension (of jurists as a whole). This approach seems advisable to avoid over-interpreting jurists'auctoritas from an ideological point of view, and also to better explain the multiple facets of the ex auctoritate argument (which is only one aspect of this rhetorical thematization of authority).
