Abstract
- With Ramesses II we encounter a historical setting somewhat reminiscent of Thutmose III. In both cases, these men reoriented the military policies of their predecessors. Or, perhaps, they were forced by circumstance to take a more direct and aggressive policy with respect to Asia owing to weaknesses in the Egyptian control of the north.
- Thutmose III was had to destroy an Asiatic coalition centered at Megiddo in Palestine. But his march northwards was a result of a failure in Egyptian hegemonic power in Asia. Ramesses II was obliged to march farther north in order to re-secure his control over the southern portion of Syria. He, likewise, had to march to that key base of the enemy, Kadesh on the River Orontes.
- Both pharaohs were reacting to outside pressure that had become great. These campaigns, I stress, had to take place despite the apparent success of their immediate predecessors. In Ramesses II's case, the apparent victories of his father Seti I (ca 1300 BC) were not as effective as many believe. Here, I provide a re-interpretation of the causes of Ramesses II's march on Kadesh.
- Then I cover his apparent strategic mistakes, even though his failure to discern the location of the Hittite enemy at Kadesh may be explained as a tactical error. Still, this misstep may not turn out to be what many modern commentators argue.
- The focus will be on the king and his personal role in "saving" that day. Thus "leadership" is a very crucial topic here.
- We are fortunate to possess a number of lengthy inscriptions and wall reliefs. They need to be examined carefully and their antecedents culled for source criticism. I shall discuss the literary flavor of the famous "Poem" of Ramesses II at Kadesh. The text, after all, reflects a choice of presentations (diction, vocabulary, rhetoric, and narrative segmentation) that need pertinent evaluation.
