Human beings are said to be profoundly social creatures, but it is often overlooked that many other animals are also extremely well adapted to social learning and interaction. Recent comparative studies on social cognition in different species show that learning from a conspecific is a widespread phenomenon. I present examples showing that we learn from others by copying, or that there is learning about others - how dominant or reliable they are, for example. This learning is important for the construction of complex social systems and the negotiations they involve, whether in fish, bees or mammals. The cognitive capacities required for this type of social learning do not presuppose consciousness. The implicit processes that enable and regulate most social behaviors are triggered automatically by the presence of conspecifics - in humans as in other social animals. There are also explicit forms of these processes, which require consciousness, and are probably reserved for humans. Their development and implementation are slow.
Imitation,overimitation and mentalization illustrate the differences between implicit and explicit forms. The phenomenon of blind copying has been studied in four-year-olds and adults. Experiments show that people copy irrational actions "because that's how it's done". This process is crucial to the construction of human culture and group identity. It is not found in chimpanzees. As for the implicit form of mentalization - the ability to recognize the intentions of others in order to predict what they are going to do - it is present in many species and can also be observed in very young children. In contrast, the explicit form of mental state attribution, which involves justifying how one explains and predicts behavior, is only observed in children after the age of four. So, while human beings are capable of unconsciously recognizing the mental state of others, they can also use mentalization to manipulate others. Humans excel at explicit social skills, but often employ them in selfish, Machiavellian ways. Pro-social goals are mainly achieved through automatic forms of imitation and alignment behaviors, as shown by the chameleon effect and experiments using intelligent imitation, with surprising effects of increased altruism.
