Wittgenstein on Perception, Emotion, and Expression

In his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Wittgenstein claims that we see other people’s emotions in their facial expressions (RPP II, 570). A possible way of understanding this claim is that facial expressions signify emotions, and that knowledge of the expressions’ meaning enables us to see emotions in the expressions. By this account, when we see emotions in other people’s expressions we draw inferences from what we know about the expressions’ meaning. That is to say that perception of emotions involves inferences from background knowledge. Yet Wittgenstein denies that when we see emotions we draw inferences (RPP II, 170, 570, 719). This leaves open the problem of explaining how we see emotions. Wittgenstein outlines an explanation in terms of the distinction between seeing and noticing. In particular, he claims that we notice emotions in the expressions (RPP I, 1070 ; II, 552). I will discuss this distinction and consider whether or not it has merit.