Résumé
In the case of some artifacts, the connection between the kind to which the artifact belongs, its function, and its capacities appears to be quite straightfoward. For example, a well-functioning can-opener belongs to the artifact-kind, can-opener, its function is to open cans, and being able to open cans is also among its capacities. This seemingly straightforward connection between artifact kinds, functions, and capacities, however, does not always obtain. A malfunctioning can-opener, for example, still belongs to the kind, can-opener, and can be said to have the function of opening cans, even though, in its current state, it seems to lack the corresponding capacity to open cans. In addition, while each artifact of course has many capacities, only some of these capacities are correlated with an artifact’s function or its kind-membership. For example, the mere fact that an anvil can be used as a doorstop does not bring it about that the kind, anvil, is regarded as a subspecies of the kind, doorstop, or that anvils are taken to have the same function as doorstops. In this talk, I explore different ways of resolving such potential misalignments between artifact kinds, functions, and capacities.
