Transparency and Solipsism

Présidence : Matheus Valente

Résumé

According to Phenomenal Transparency, experiencing a phenomenal property puts one is in a position to acquire knowledge of its essence. In this paper, I will argue that Phenomenal Transparency risks forcing upon us a species of solipsism according to which one is, necessarily, the sole bearer of phenomenal properties. If Phenomenal Transparency holds, having a painful experience puts one in a position to know that pain is THIS (where ‘THIS’ is a phenomenal concept that captures the essence of pain). The solipsist who endorses Phenomenal Transparency claims to be entitled to a reading of ‘THIS’ whereby THIS does not occur unless one is pain oneself. By their lights, then, it turns out to belong to the essence of pain that pain never occurs in others. After examining some unsuccessful attempts to delegitimize the solipsist’s reading of ‘THIS’, I will suggest that – unless we are willing to deny Phenomenal Transparency altogether – we may want to come to terms with the solipsist’s conclusion in the framework of a more general rethinking of the metaphysics of the phenomenal.